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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE RECORD ON APPEAL DEMONSTRATES THE COURT OF 
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFICER HAD 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ARREST 
MR, HARKER FOR INSURANCE VIOLATIONS THAT DID NOT 
OCCUR IN THE OFFICER'S PRESENCE. 
In the Brief of Respondent, the State argues that Mr. 
Harker's arrest for operating a motor vehicle without insurance 
"was supported by probable cause and statutory authority." See 
Brief of Respondent, p. 5, et seg. The record on appeal, for the 
reasons set forth below, demonstrates that this argument is 
without merit. 
In the case at bar, Officer Osoro arrested Mr. Harker for an 
insurance violation. Prior to the arrest, Officer Osoro had been 
advised by Officer Gwilliam, the assisting officer, that the North 
Salt Lake Police Department had "had numerous dealings" with Mr. 
Harker (R. 171:20:20-25), which, according to Officer Gwilliam, 
involved "numerous traffic offenses and vehicle offenses, such as 
insurance and registration and things of that nature." (R. 
171:21:16-25). That statement was patently untrue. At that time, 
Mr. Harker's Utah Driver License record demonstrated a total lack 
of insurance violations (R. 75-76). In the process of checking 
Mr. Harker's driver license and registration, Officer Osoro had 
access to Mr. Harker's criminal history, which indicated prior 
drug related charges (R. 68; R. 77-84). Upon effectuating the 
1 
arrest, Officer Osoro searched Mr. Harker, finding a small or 
trace amount oE methamphetamine on Mr. Harker's person. 
Mr. Harker's arrest upon which the search was premised is 
lawful only "if it is supported by probable cause and authorized 
by statute." State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ^2 5, 57 P. 3d 1052 
(emphasis added) (citing State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199-1204 
(Utah 1995) and United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th 
Cir. 1989)); see also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 
S.Ct. 168 (1959) (stating that "if an arrest without a warrant is 
to support an incidental search, it must be made with probable 
cause/'); State v. White, 577 P.2d 552, 554 (Utah 1978) 
(discussing how arrest justified by probable cause supports search 
incident to arrest). 
According to both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution,1 an 
officer must have probable cause before effectuating a warrantless 
arrest. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S. Ct. 
2637 (1979) (stating that "the [United States] Constitution 
permits an officer to arrest a suspect without a warrant if there 
xIn response to footnote 1 on page 10 of the State's Brief, 
Petitioner acknowledges that no separate state constitutional 
analysis is advanced on appeal. However, Petitioner's citation to 
article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution is for demonstrative 
purposes only, demonstrating that both the United States and Utah 
Constitution require "probable cause" prior to effectuating a 
warrantless arrest. 
2 
is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is 
committing an offense."); accord Trane, 2002 UT 97 at %26. 
Probable cause justifying an arrest is delineated as uxfacts and 
circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient 
to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in 
believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. "' 
Trane, 2002 UT 97 at ^27 (quoting DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37, 99 
S.Ct. 2627 and citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 
S.Ct. 854 (1975); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223 
(1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 
1302 (1949)). The determination of whether the police had 
probable cause to arrest someone without a warrant "should be made 
on an objective standard: whether from the facts known to the 
officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly . . . be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] 
position would be justified in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense.'" State v. Cole, 61A P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 
1983) (quoting State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 320, 495 P.2d 
1259, 1260 (1972)); see also State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 
1232-33 (Utah 1996). 
The well-settled common-law rule provides that u [a] law 
enforcement officer has probable cause whenever the crime is 
3 
committed in the presence of that officer because the observing 
officer knows of sufficient facts to believe that the suspect 
committed the crime alleged." See Trane, 2002 UT 97 at i]28; see 
also Atwater v. City of Lugo Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct . 
1536 (2001); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 96 S. Ct. 
820 (1976) (stating that "[t]he cases construing the Fourth 
Amendment thus reflect the ancient common-law rule that a peace 
officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a 
misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence . . . . " ) ; United 
States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1003 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
officer's observation of suspect committing misdemeanor offense 
afforded officer probable cause and legitimate basis to arrest 
suspect). Consistent with the well-settled common-law rule, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) specifically addresses the circumstances 
under which an officer may effectuate an arrest: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority 
of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a 
person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or 
attempted in the presence of any peace officer; 
"presence" includes all of the physical senses or 
any device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, 
or range of any physical sense, or records the 
observations of any of the physical senses; 
•k -k k ~k 
4 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (emphasis added).2 
In Utah Liquor Control Comm'n v. Wooras, 97 Utah 3 51, 93 P. 2d 
455 (1939), this Court explained the meaning of acts committed uin 
the presence" of the arresting officer. The Court stated that 
"[t]he meaning of 'acts committed in the presence of the arresting 
officer' is not elastic but as a general proposition is limited to 
acts that are committed within the arresting officer's knowledge 
being obtained through his sight, hearing, or other senses, or by 
the offender's admission of the facts made before his arrest." 
Id. at 362, 93 P. 2d 455.3 In other words, the acts must have been 
contemporaneously committed within the officer's sight, hearing, 
or other senses or by admission made before the offender's arrest. 
Id.4 
2A true and correct copy of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (2003) is 
attached to the Brief of Petitioner as Addendum C. 
3A true and correct copy of Utah Liquor Control Comm'n v. Wooras, 
97 Utah 351, 93 P.2d 455 (1939) is attached to the Brief of 
Petitioner as Addendum D. 
4The State, in its Brief, cites State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 
145, fl7, 111 P.3d 808, for the proposition that ua police officer is 
entitled to rely on information gained from other police officers" m 
making a probable cause determination. See Brief of Respondent, p. 
16. While this may be true, such information cannot be the sole 
basis for the probable cause determination unless the information 
constitutes information of an offense committed or attempted m the 
presence of an officer. See Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at ^2 
(information plus officers' observance of offense); State v. Hodson, 
866 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 907 
P 2d 1155 (Utah 1995) (police informant information plus officer's 
observance of possible drug ingestion). Otherwise, the exception 
5 
Apparently conceding that Mr. Harker7s operation of the car 
was "physically outside the officer's presence/'5 the State argues 
that Mr. Harker's alleged "admission, that he was driving his car 
at the time of the accident, is the legal equivalent of . 
having driven in the officer's presence." See Brief of 
Respondent, p. 11. Contrary to the State's assertion, Wooras 
requires that the "offender's admission of the facts [be] made 
before his arrest." The portion of Officer Osoro's testimony 
relied upon by the State does not constitute an admission by Mr. 
Harker that he was driving the vehicle. Cf. Brief of Respondent, 
p. 11, with R. 171:3:17-20. Further, the only real semblance of 
such an admission is Officer Osoro's self-serving, unsubstantiated 
preliminary-hearing testimony that Mr. Harker at some point had 
admitted to turning left in front of the oncoming traffic. Upon 
closer review, Officer Osoro's testimony during the preliminary 
hearing indicates that any so-called admission, if any, was made 
after Mr. Harker's arrest. See R. 171:5:5-23.6 In addition, the 
would swallow the rule. 
5See R. 172:22:2-4 (unrebutted testimony of Mr. Harker at the 
suppression hearing that Officer Osoro arrived at the scene about ten 
minutes after the accident). 
6At the preliminary hearing, the State elicited the following 
testimony from Officer Osoro: 
Prosecutor: Did you talk with Officer Gwilliam about 
maybe talking to the insurance company? 
Officer Osoro: I did. 
6 
dubious nature of this so-called admission is further borne out by 
the fact that the trial court, at the conclusion of the 
preliminary hearing, bound Mr. Harker over solely on the 
possession of methamphetamine charge. See R. 171:35-36.7 
As the basis for its determination that the Officer had 
probable cause to arrest Mr. Harker, the court of appeals stated 
the following m its Memorandum Decision: 
Here, the Officer had probable cause and 
statutory authorization to arrest Defendant for 
driving without insurance. Although the Officer 
did not observe Defendant driving, the Officer 
responded to a traffic accident that was blocking 
Prosecutor: And what did he tell you? 
Officer Osoro: He advised me that the insurance policy had 
been canceled at a prior date. 
Prosecutor: Thank you. At that point what did you do? 
Officer Osoro: At that point I placed Mr. Harker under 
arrest for the insurance violation, advised 
him of his Miranda rights. When I asked 
him about the insurance he stated that he 
[was] fully aware that it had been 
canceled. Then I searched him incident to 
arrest. 
Prosecutor: Okay. Now, did you talk to anybody or get 
any statements concerning the accident 
itself? 
Officer Osoro: I did. I got a statement from the 
defendant and also from the other driver, 
Mrs. Ludlow. 
R. 171:5:5-23. 
7At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court 
stated: u0n that basis, the Court finds that the State has 
established probable cause that the defendant did knowingly and 
intentionally possess a controlled substance, to wit, 
me thamphet amine. We'll bind him over on that charge." See R. 
171:35-36 (emphasis added). 
7 
the lanes of travel on Highway 89 and saw two 
damaged vehicles, one of which belonged to 
Defendant. At the scene, the Officer heard 
Defendant and the other driver admit that they had 
been involved in the accident. The Officer asked 
for Defendant's driver license, insurance 
information and registration, all of which 
Defendant provided. The Officer then ran a 
computer check and saw the computer report 
indicating that confirmation of insurance coverage 
was not found for Defendant's vehicle. The 
Officer also heard an assisting officer state that 
Defendant's insurance policy had been cancelled at 
a prior date. Defendant's admission, as well as 
the information the Officer saw and heard, 
reasonably led the Officer to believe that 
Defendant had been driving a vehicle without 
insurance. Because the offense of driving without 
insurance had been committed in the Officer's 
presence, the Officer had probable cause to arrest 
Defendant. 
See State v. Harker, 2008 UT App 455U, cert, granted, 207 P.3d 
432, pp. 2-3, attached to the Brief of Petitioner as Addendum A. 
In the course of its decision, the court of appeals 
erroneously concluded that Mr. Harker had admitted facts serving 
as a basis for the arrest. Aside from its acknowledgment that 
"the Officer did not observe Defendant driving",8 the court 
asserted that "the Officer heard Defendant and the other driver 
[at the scene] admit that they had been involved in the accident. " 
Id. at p. 2. Wooras, however, as previously discussed, requires 
the "offender's admission of the facts [be] made before his 
8See R. 172:22:2-4 (unrebutted testimony of Mr. Harker at the 
suppression hearing that Officer Osoro arrived at the scene about ten 
minutes after the accident). 
8 
arrest." (Emphasis added). Again, the only real semblance of 
evidence m the record appearing to support such an admission is 
Officer Osoro's self-serving, unsubstantiated preliminary-hearing 
testimony that Mr. Harker had admitted to turning left in front of 
the oncoming traffic. See R. 171:6-9. Contrary to the court of 
appeals' assertion, Officer Osoro's preliminary hearing testimony 
indicates that the so-called admission, if any, was made after Mr. 
Harker's arrest. See R. 171:5:5-23.9 
Additionally, the court of appeals misinterpreted both Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) and Wooras by reasoning, as a general 
proposition, that an officer might unconditionally rely upon 
information obtained from another officer to determine probable 
cause.10 Such an interpretation goes well beyond the plain 
language and meaning of the statute by stretching the common sense 
meaning of " m the presence of" any officer. The acts committed 
in the presence of any officer serving as a basis for a probable 
cause determination "is limited to acts that are committed within 
9This particular text of Officer Osoro's preliminary hearing 
testimony is set forth m footnote 3 above. 
10The court of appeals employed an apparent contradiction in its 
Memorandum Decision by first acknowledging that "the Officer did not 
observe Defendant driving . . . .", State v. Marker, 2009 UT 455U, 
cert, granted, 207 P.3d 432, p. 2, and then stating that w [b]ecause 
the offense of driving without insurance had been committed in the 
Officers's presence, the Officer had probable cause to arrest 
Defendant " Id. at pp. 2-3. 
9 
the arresting officer's knowledge being obtained through his 
sight, hearing, or other senses." See Wooras, 97 Utah 351 at 362, 
93 P.2d 455. In other words, the officer's observation is limited 
to the acts or conduct serving as a basis for the alleged 
violations, not second-hand information communicated by other 
third parties who failed to observe the necessary acts to 
reasonably believe that the suspect committed a crime. Id. In 
light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the instant 
case, the police encounter with Mr. Harker constituted an 
constitutionally unreasonable search and seizure. This 
determination is further warranted by the sound constitutionally 
mandated principles that u[w]arrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement[,]" State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 
(Utah 1992); see also State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 
(Utah 1995) (quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 P. 2d 684, 687 (Utah 
1990)); and State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1986), and 
that uthe police bear a heavy burden when attempting to 
demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches 
or arrests." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50, 104 S.Ct. 
2091 (1984) . 
As part of its rationale, the court of appeals reasoned that 
Officer Osoro relied upon information obtained from another 
10 
Officer, who informed Officer Osoro that Mr. Harker's insurance 
policy had been canceled on a prior date.11 In support of this 
proposition, the court of appeals cited State v. Alverez, 2005 UT 
App 145, fl7, 111 P. 3d 808, for the premise that "a police officer 
is entitled to rely on information gained from other police 
officers" in making a probable cause determination.12 See Marker, 
2008 UT App 455U at p. 2. Nevertheless, the information obtained 
from another officer cannot be the sole basis for the probable 
cause determination unless it constitutes information of an 
offense committed or attempted m the presence of an officer. See 
Alverez, 2005 UT App 145 at %2 (information plus officers' 
observance of offense); State v. Hodson, 866 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (police informant information plus officer's 
observance of possible drug ingestion), rev'd on other grounds, 
11Prior to Mr. Harker's arrest, Officer Osoro had been advised 
by Officer Gwilliam that the North Salt Lake Police Department had 
uhad numerous dealings" with Mr. Harker (R. 171:20:20-25), which, 
according to Officer Gwilliam, involved "numerous traffic offenses 
and vehicle offenses, such as insurance and registration and things 
of that nature." (R. 171:21:16-25). Not only was that statement 
patently untrue, inasmuch as Mr. Harker's Utah Driver License record 
demonstrates a total lack of insurance violations (R. 75-76), but it 
served as the basis for treating Mr. Harker differently than other 
individuals m similar circumstances (Id.). 
12The State, citing Officer Osoro's testimony, argues that Mr. 
Harker admitted at the scene that he was aware that his insurance had 
been canceled due to a failure to make payments. See Brief of 
Respondent, p. 18. Mr. Harker, however, testified that he thought 
the vehicle was covered at the time (R. 172:24:21-24). 
11 
907 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995) . Otherwise, the requirement, for 
probable cause purposes, that any public offense be committed or 
attempted in the presence of a peace officer would be rendered 
meaningless. The Officer lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. 
Marker because he failed to observe the alleged violations. Any 
knowledge procured by Officer Osoro during the events in question 
was premised, if at all, upon insufficient facts to believe that 
the suspect, Mr. Harker, had committed the alleged crimes. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Petitioner, Mr. Harker respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the court of appeals' decision 
affirming the denial of the motion to suppress and remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this Court's instructions 
as set forth in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day/o£\ September, 2009 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
Wigozns 
f (Srxget i t i o n e r 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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